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Abstract
To what extent has Brexit affected Norwegians’ perceptions of their current relationship with the EU? What are the con-
siderations that central political and societal actors bring up to explain their stances? What are the broader lessons for
the EU’s relations with non-members? We argue that Norway’s EU affiliation is so close that we can draw on Catherine
De Vries’ benchmark theory to assess whether Brexit affects Norwegians’ assessments of Norway’s relationship with the
EU. We focus on the Norwegian government’s stance. Further, we consider opinion polls to understand the strength of
domestic support for the EEAAgreement, andwhether that support has changed as a consequence of Brexit.We thereafter
look for political entrepreneurs or political change agents, in political parties, in interest groups, and among civil society
activists. We find that Brexit has not served as a benchmark. It has not set in motion efforts to change Norway’s EU affilia-
tion. Opponents diverge on alternatives, although share concerns about what they see as the EU’s neoliberal orientation.
The analysis shows that we cannot assess Brexit as a benchmark without paying attention to the sheer size and magnitude
of the EU–Norway power asymmetry.
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1. Introduction
The EU has developed a comprehensive system of affil-
iations with neighboring states. The system of EU affil-
iations has bearings on the process and outcome of
Brexit, given that it represents templates for how the
UK and the EU may organize their relations post-Brexit.
Conversely, these affiliations can be affected by the UK’s
exit from the EU. That is what we consider here with
explicit reference to Norway. This article addresses the
following questions: To what extent has Brexit affected
Norwegians’ perceptions of their current relationship
with the EU? What are the considerations that central
political and societal actors bring up to explain their
stances? What are the broader lessons for the EU’s rela-
tions with non-members? We examine the views of a
wide range of Norwegian actors in order to establish
whether they have Brexit-related rationales for altering
Norway’s relationship with the EU. The assessment of
whether the UK’s decision to leave the EU has affected
Norwegians’ views of their current EU affiliation will pro-
vide us with important insights into the robustness of
the EU’s present arrangements with non-members, what
is often referred to as the pattern of EU external differ-
entiation (“externalization of the acquis communitaire”;
Leuffen, Rittberger, & Schimmelfennig, 2013, p. 17).
There are several reasons for paying special atten-
tion to Norway. For one, Norway’s EU affiliation, through
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the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and a
host of other agreements, places Norway among the
EU’s most closely affiliated non-members. Norway is
one among few affiliated non-members that qualifies
for EU membership (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015). That is
important for comparability with the UK, which through
its well over four decades of EU membership is thor-
oughly Europeanized. Further, the EU’s aim was initially
to establish an agreement with the UK that was as simi-
lar to Norway’s EEA affiliation as possible, not the least
because the EEA Agreement has formed the template
for the EU’s relations with its most closely associated
non-members (Gstöhl & Phinnemore, 2019).
The UK, on its part, has rejected the type of sin-
gle market participation and membership in the EU’s
Customs Union that the EEA Agreement implies. After
long and protracted negotiations, the EU–UK Trade and
Cooperation Agreement was signed on December 24,
2020. Nevertheless, transitory elements, implementa-
tion reviews and openings for further multilateral and
bilateral cooperation leave quite a bit of fluidity. It
is therefore questionable whether what we know at
present provides us with sufficiently stable markers to
tell us what form of privileged partnership the UK will
end up with.
What we at present can investigate is whether the
example of Brexit has affected members’ and affiliated
countries’ assessments of their present EU relationship.
For sovereigntists across Europe, Brexit and the mantra
of ‘taking back control’ offers the prospect of escaping
from the shackles of the EU. At the same time, the UK’s
complicated process of exiting from the EU shows how
profoundly EU member states have been incorporated
in the EU-led European political and economic order,
not only vertically but also horizontally through tight
bonds and interdependencies between states and soci-
eties across Europe.
In the following, we start by spelling out the analyt-
ical framework. It draws on Catherine De Vries’ (2017,
2018) benchmark theory. Her application of this theory
to Brexit posits that people compare the costs and ben-
efits of their current EU affiliation with alternative sta-
tuses (of non-membership). In applying the benchmark
theory to Norway, we must identify the actors that refer
to Brexit as a template for Norway’s future EU affilia-
tion and the aspects—issues and concerns—they base
their evaluations on. The next section outlines the dis-
tinctive features of Norway’s EU affiliation in order to
clarify the nature of the status quo, which is necessary
for understandingwhatNorwegians assess Brexit against.
The subsequent section considers the actors’ stances.
We start with the Norwegian government, thereafter
consider opinion polls to understand the strength of
domestic support for the EEA Agreement, and whether
the level of support has changed as a consequence of
Brexit. After that, we look for political entrepreneurs
or political change agents in political parties, interest
groups, and among civil society activists, notably the sig-
nificant No to the EU organization. In the final concluding
section, we discern broader lessons from this case study
for the EU’s relations with affiliated non-members.
2. Brexit and Benchmark Theory
There was quite a bit of concern after the Brexit vote
in 2016 that the UK’s example would encourage other
member states to exit the EU. That has not materialized
in the EU’s member states. Instead of fragmentation, the
EU’s response to Brexit thus far has been, to cite Brigid
Laffan (2020), “rapid, united and effective.” In this article,
our concern is whether we see similar patterns of pre-
serving the status quo in closely affiliated non-member
states. If we look at the case of Switzerland, we see that
the EU has been concerned with preventing Brexit from
having spillover effects. Swiss voters in a recent referen-
dum appear to have recognized this by rejecting a pro-
posal that would have torn up Switzerland’s free move-
ment agreement with the EU (Jones, 2020).
Do we see similar patterns in Norwegians’ evalua-
tions of their EU affiliation? In order to address this,
and to draw broader lessons for the EU’s relations with
affiliated non-members, we need to identify not only
change agents, but also the factors that key veto play-
ers (such as governments) hold up as decisive for their
stances. That means that we need a theoretical frame-
work that says something about actors’ reasoning when
confronted with what some see as a threat to stability
and others see as an opportunity for change or trans-
formation. The benchmark theory offers precisely such
a theory.
According to the benchmark theory:
People’s attitudes towards Europe are ultimately
rooted in a comparison, namely a comparison
between the benefits of the current status quo of
membership with those associated with an alterna-
tive state of one’s country being outside the EU. The
decision of the British to leave the EU provides peo-
ple with valuable information about the possible eco-
nomic and political costs and benefits associatedwith
the alternative state. (De Vries, 2017, pp. 40–41)
The benchmark theory builds on the notion that citi-
zens’ levels of EU support depend on their perception
of national political and economic performance. Brexit
provides an opportunity to extend that to a comparison
across national contexts. Prior to Brexit, such compar-
isons had to be based on counterfactuals—and all the
uncertainty associated with using such as benchmarks—
given the lack of real-life examples of states exiting
the EU.
When the UK exited from the EU and became the
first ex-member state (Lord, 2015), it replaced the coun-
terfactual with a real-life example. The tangled Brexit
process exhibits the dilemmas, choices and conflicts
involved in exiting from the EU in today’s interdepen-
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dent world. The benchmark theory posits that actors
calculate utility (costs and benefits) as well as relate to
risk and uncertainty. We posit that the more uncertainty
there is about the UK’s future EU affiliation, the more
difficult it is for actors to calculate utility. Uncertainty
brings up power relations and patterns of asymmetri-
cal interdependence.
In applying the benchmark theory to closely affili-
ated non-members such as Norway, we need to keep
in mind that “the transaction costs associated with
leaving are different from those of not joining” (De
Vries, 2017, p. 41). We recognize this and therefore
adopt the reverse approach: We consider whether the
UK’s departure from the EU has served as a bench-
mark for how Norwegians assess their EU affiliation. We
argue that this comparison is valid, given that we clar-
ify an important issue about sovereignty with bearing on
comparability. Brexit is about restoring UK sovereignty,
whereas Norway through the EEA Agreement and its
other agreementswith the EUhas not formally rescinded
sovereignty to the EU. This difference can affect appli-
cation of the benchmark theory to Norway. One issue
is whether formal retention of sovereignty is matched
by real-life or lived experience; the other is whether the
issue of sovereignty affects Norwegians’ perceptions of
their own country’s performance.
On the former, Norway’s EU affiliation is so close
and committing that there is a gap between formal
sovereignty and actual autonomy. Our starting assump-
tion builds on that: The more closely affiliated the
non-member is to the EU—the fewer differences there
are between the lived reality of the EU member and
the non-member—the more relevant for Norway are
De Vries’ findings from applying the benchmark theory
to EU member states.
On the latter, the discrepancy between formal
sovereignty and actual autonomy sets Norway apart
from EU member states and has bearings on how
Norwegians assess their EU affiliation. On the one hand,
the gap between formal sovereignty and actual auton-
omy can trigger pleas for action to align reality with for-
mal status. On the other hand, key political actors who
are concerned with retaining Norway’s close EU affilia-
tion attach great importance to keeping the controver-
sial sovereignty issue off the political agenda. ForNorway,
both the question of sovereignty and EU membership
can serve as a ‘benchmark trigger.’ There are actors that
are interested in pursuing alternatives to the present EU
affiliation, regardless of Brexit.
De Vries presents three sets of findings that we dis-
cuss in relation to Norway. First is that Brexit brings
up uncertainties surrounding the UK’s role and status
post-Brexit, which prompt EU members to favor the sta-
tus quo. As we explicate below, we expect a similar effect
in Norway due to the high level of asymmetrical polit-
ical and economic interdependence and the close ties
that bind Norway to the EU. Non-membership forms of
affiliation are precarious, especially under conditions of
rapid contextual changes. We thus expect support for
the status quo to be especially strong with regard to the
Norwegian government. Norway’s EU affiliation adds to
that. It is a political compromise that has been deliber-
ately depoliticized. We expect the government to be par-
ticularly concerned about the need for minimizing risks
and disruptions.
De Vries’ second finding is that Brexit appears to
increase public support for EU membership. Translated
to Norway our second assumption is that Brexit will
favor the status quo, by increasing support for the
EEA Agreement as the main and most visible plank of
Norway’s EU affiliation.
A third effect that De Vries presents is the rise of
Eurosceptic populist political entrepreneurs that do not
share the government’s assessment of the risks associ-
ated with altering the status quo, and therefore seek to
change it. Our third assumption is that we expect a sim-
ilar development in Norway given that Norwegian EU
membership remains a contested issue.
What then are the cost-benefit and risk assessments
that Norwegians apply? As noted above, themore uncer-
tainty there is surrounding the UK’s future EU relation-
ship, the less reliable the utility calculations, and the
more actors’ assessments will focus on reducing uncer-
tainty. Norway’s EU affiliation is a precarious attempt
at reconciling sovereignty retention with access to the
EU’s single market and EU programs. Thus, we expect
the actors to be well-aware of the political and eco-
nomic costs and risks of changing the status quo and for
this to figure as a central theme in their assessments.
Governments share with business communities an onus
on stable and predictable rules and terms of operation,
not only in the economic but in the political realm.
Risk and uncertainty are bound up with power
and hegemony. Closely affiliated non-members are
aware of the asymmetrical nature of their EU affil-
iation, which suggests that they may be concerned
with the possible fall-outs of perhaps even fairly
unsubstantial changes. EU members have access to
decision-making forums where they can renegotiate the
terms of their affiliation through opt-outs and deroga-
tions, etc. For non-members, there is no similar access,
and as we noted above with reference to Switzerland,
non-members are concerned that efforts to change
aspects of an affiliation may put the affiliation at risk.
There is for instance a ‘guillotine clause’ in the Schengen
agreement so that deviations or non-compliance entail
that the entire agreement unravels. Norway has also for
instance never actually used the EEA Agreement’s right
of reservation (Article 102) that allows a party to opt-out
of a piece of legislation without blocking the entire legis-
lation. The implication is that power and the significant
asymmetry in Norway–EU relationsmatter to Norwegian
actors’ assessments of the balance of risk versus utility of
a given mode of affiliation.
For many Norwegians, factors affecting their views
of the EU and what they look for in relation to Brexit
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are issues related to the welfare state, immigration,
economic regulations and social regulations, and gen-
der equality. These are long-lasting concerns that have
affected people’s views of the EU (as was readily appar-
ent in the 1994 EU referendum). They straddle the line
between specific policies and the broader outlines of
a model of social economy that is environmentally sus-
tainable. The EU has underlined the need to sustain
its understanding of social market economy and envi-
ronmental sustainability (European Commission, 2017).
Whether Norwegians align with the EU’s stance or not,
we expect Norwegians to be concerned as to where the
UK post-Brexit locates itself on the issues of market inter-
vention, social justice and environmental sustainability.
Norwegians clearly follow the Brexit process with great
interest (Haugevik, 2017), even if they may not consider
it a case to emulate.
3. Outlining the Status Quo: Overview of Norway’s
Current EU Affiliation
Before analyzing how the various types of actors in
Norway see Brexit as a possible spur to reconsider
Norway’s EU affiliation, we need to look more closely
at this affiliation and especially the thorny issue of
sovereignty. We start by presenting in broad outlines the
nature of this affiliation, and thereafter lookmore closely
at the politics surrounding it.
Norway signed the EEA Agreement with the EU
before the 1994 EU membership referendum. Today,
Norway’s EU affiliation consists in more than 70 agree-
ments, ranging from the internal market, Schengen asso-
ciation agreements, agreements on asylum and police
cooperation (Dublin I, II and III), agreements on foreign
and security policy (Norway participates in the EU’s bat-
tle groups), and agreements on internal security and
justice cooperation. Through these agreements, Norway
has incorporated roughly three-quarters of EU legislation
compared to those EU member states that have incor-
porated everything (Official Norwegian Reports, 2012).
In effect, Norway’s approach has been to seek as close an
EU association as is possible for a non-member. Assessed
in terms of per capita, Norway’s contribution is less than
two-thirds of the UK’s (£140 per person in Norway and
£220 per person in the UK).
Institutionally speaking, the EEA Agreement is based
on a two-pillar structure with bridging arrangements
between EFTA and the EU, a court, and a surveillance
body, the European Surveillance Authority (see EFTA,
2017). The two-pillar structure was understood as the
only possible solution that would retain an intergov-
ernmental agreement without supranational character-
istics (Børde, 1997, p. 111). The EEA-EFTA states were
not willing to rescind sovereignty to a set of interna-
tional institutions.
Nevertheless, in actual practice these states are pro-
foundly affected by the EU. Within the EEA-EFTA states,
the EU’s legislation—in contrast to the situation in the
member states—is not formally anchored in the legal pre-
cepts of supremacy and direct effect. The reality is, how-
ever, not as different as the formal structure would sug-
gest (Egeberg & Trondal, 1999; Eriksen & Fossum, 2015).
As Gänzle and Henökl (2017) note, the relationship is
close to ‘quasi membership.’
In the member states, EU law trumps national law in
those issue-areas where the EU has been conferred com-
petence, whereas in Norway, the European Surveillance
Authority ensures that legal incorporation is in accor-
dance with EU law, and the EFTA Court in practice
ensures the incorporation of EU law. This relationship is
clearly one-way; Norwegian citizens are pure recipients
of decisionsmade outside of Norway. There is no form of
reciprocity or ‘export’ of Norwegian decisions to the EU.
This dense and dynamic model of affiliation has
important bearings on Norway’s ability to retain its
socioeconomic model, which has historically speaking
been marked by economic governance, including state
support; organized working life; and public welfare ser-
vices. The EU has especially in the last decade moved
in a neoliberal direction, which has been embedded in
the manner in which it promotes the four freedoms: per-
sons, capital, goods and services. Norway is a heavily
Europeanized country, and is therefore feeling the full
effects of these developments. It should however be
added thatNorway has compensatory arrangements and
a strong fiscal buffer; thus has domestic leverage to pro-
tect the most vulnerable groups and persons from mar-
ket and other contingencies (Fossum & Graver, 2018).
Norway’s EU affiliation is touted as a compromise.
It must be viewed in light of the fact that Norway has
applied for EU membership four times. The two first, in
1962 and 1967 were aborted due to de Gaulle’s veto
against the UK’s application. The two latter, submitted
in 1970 and 1992, saw small majorities of the population
rejecting EU membership in popular referenda (in 1972,
53.5% against and 46.5% for, and in 1994 52.2% against,
and 47.8% for).
What is important to underline is that the political
dimension of Norway’s EU affiliation is marked by a para-
dox: The question of EU membership remains a very
contentious issue, and yet, Norway’s close and dynamic
EU affiliation has sparked very little political controversy
(Official Norwegian Reports, 2012). The main reason
is that Norwegian governing coalitions and the party
system have successfully de-coupled the controversy sur-
rounding the EUmembership issue from the ongoing pro-
cess of EU adaptation.
The political mobilizations and the very high referen-
dum participation rates (79.2% in 1972 and as high as
89% in 1994; Statistics Norway, 1995) show how divisive
the issue of Norwegian EU membership has been. This
question has figured as one of, if not, the, most politi-
cally divisive issues in Norway, at least since the Second
World War. The EU membership issue reawakened or
gave added impetus to old and entrenched cleavages,
such as center against periphery, region against region,
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rural against urban areas, and deep divisions within and
between political parties. The main difference between
1972 and 1994 was that defense of the welfare state, the
public sector and gender equality became more impor-
tant reasons for rejecting EU membership.
To avoid destructive political battles, political actors
have for a long time taken measures to de-politicize
the contentious EU membership issue; hence keeping
the contentious issue of sovereignty off the political
agenda. Norwegian parties operate with a set of gag
rules to keep the issue of EU membership off the polit-
ical agenda (Fossum, 2019). Norway’s proportional elec-
toral system makes it very difficult for a single party to
gain amajority; hence parties enter into coalitions. Every
coalition constellation since 1994 has consisted of par-
ties that variously support EU membership and oppose
it. All of these coalition agreements are based on the
notion that a political party that seeks to alter the status
quo—actively seeking EU membership or revoking the
EEA Agreement—will violate the coalition agreement.
No governing party has therefore activelyworked to alter
the status quo.
By removing the most contentious issue of constitu-
tional and political sovereignty from the political agenda,
this arrangement makes rapid and dynamic EU adap-
tation possible. That explains the paradox listed above.
The effect is for conflict and disagreement to shift away
from the contentious normative questions about consti-
tutional and political sovereignty and onto single issues,
which can be treated as isolated incidents.
A governing party that tries to undo the status quo
thus faces significant political risks, in that the coalition
may unravel. It is difficult to understand these political
constellations and forms of self-bind without taking into
account the significant asymmetry in power relations
between the EU and Norway.
In the following, we consider what aspects of
Norway’s EU relationship Brexit may set in motion, and
do so across a wide range of different actors. Our main
approach is to look for explicit references to Brexit; we
do not include change proposals or pleas for change that
do not make this connection explicitly. Brexit can trigger
action to reinforce Norway’s existing EU affiliation, either
through a closer engagement with the EU or through ini-
tiating an EU membership process.
If we look at the different positions that have been
proposed in the debate on Norway’s EU affiliation over
time, we find the following options: 1) Abolish the EEA
Agreement and negotiate a free trade agreement with
the EU; 2) renegotiate the EEAAgreement; 3) renegotiate
Schengen (with or without changes to the EEA); 4) apply
for EU membership. Brexit could trigger initiatives along
all of these.
4. The Positions of the Norwegian Actors
The previous section showed how closely affiliated
Norway is with the EU. At the same time, there is no
doubt that Brexit is consequential given that the UK
is Norway’s largest single-state trade partner in goods
(Norwegian Government, 2016). Hence, the arrange-
ment that the UK settles with the EU will have direct
effects on Norway, since the goods trade is regulated by
the EEA Agreement. In the following, we will outline the
various actors’ positions.
4.1. The Norwegian Government’s Position
The Norwegian government has, in line with the first
expectation we derived from the benchmark theory, con-
sistently defended the status quo by stressing the impor-
tance of retaining the EEA Agreement. Foreign Minister
IneM. Eriksen, at ameeting in the Parliament’s European
Affairs Committee on February 7, 2018, noted that many
people appear to think that Norway’s relationship to the
EU will change with Brexit; she rejected this assessment
arguing that: “It does not. Our relationship to the EU
is there through the EEA Agreement and other agree-
ments, but it is our relationship toGreat Britainwherewe
will form other agreements and build other frameworks”
(Søreide, 2018a, authors’ translation). The government
stressed its preference for a ‘tidy’ and predictable Brexit
process and outcome, not a messy process and a no deal
outcome. The government is thus not only concerned
with retaining the status quo in relation to the EU but
wants stable relations with the UK.
The onus on retaining status quo also implies a pri-
oritization of relations. The Foreign Minister noted on
October 20, 2018 that:
A position that we share with the EU is that we
are very concerned about the integrity of the inter-
nal market, namely that it should not be possible
to divide up the four freedoms and as such destroy
the internal market…we are concerned about having
a very close relationship to the British and a close
trading relationship also after Brexit. But we must at
the same time be clear that for Norwegian interests
it is readily apparent that preservation of the inter-
nal market which provides us with common rules of
conduct, market access, common standards etc. is
immensely important for Norway given that 80% of
our exports go to the EU. That includes the oppor-
tunity to bring in labor when we need it. (Søreide,
2018b, authors’ translation)
The government that has been in power since 2013 is
now a minority coalition government. It is composed
of two parties in favor of EU membership, and one
party that is against EU membership but in favor of
retaining the EEA Agreement. The opposition is also
divided but mainly over the EEA issue. The largest party
Arbeiderpartiet (Labor) no longer has EUmembership as
a stated party aim but supports the EEA Agreement. The
same do de Grønne (the Greens), whereas Senterpartiet
(the Center Party), Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress
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Party), Sosialistist Venstreparti (the Socialist Left Party)
and Rødt (Red) all want to renegotiate Norway’s EU affil-
iation in the direction of a less comprehensive arrange-
ment. We will after the next section on public support
check the constellation of party positions and whether
these have changed in order to get a better sense of
the robustness of government support for its status quo
line, as well as the arguments and justifications that
change-seeking parties present.
4.2. Changes in Public Support for the EEA Agreement
after the UK Referendum?
As noted above, a key concern of the benchmark the-
ory was to establish whether the uncertainties associ-
ated with Brexit led to increased EU support. Figures 1
and 2 show the results of opinion polls on the Norwegian
population’s views on EU and EEAmembership over time.
The graphs merge these polls. In those years where sev-
eral polls have been conducted, we have listed the aver-
age of these. For the EEA barometer there are no mea-
sures for 2013–2015.
Figure 1 is on support for EEA membership, in other
words the status quo, and shows that this has seen a
steady rise from 46% in 2012 to 62% in 2020. Opposition
to the EEA has fallen from 34% in 2012 to 25% in 2020,
exposing a widening gap between supporters and oppo-
nents of the EEA. If we look at the curves, we see a
significant increase in support for the EEA Agreement
between 2012 and 2016, but how much of that can be
directly attributed to Brexit is not clear, since we lack fig-
ures for 2013–2015. Nevertheless, the change between
2012–2016 was reinforced through a steady increase in
support for the EEA Agreement after 2016.
With regard to EU membership, we see in Figure 2
that opposition to EUmembership was at 74.3% in 2012,
but has declined to 62.7% in 2020, whereas support for
EU membership has increased from 16.7% in 2012 to
28.3% in 2020.
We thus see that the pattern of support is con-
sistent with the second assumption of the benchmark
theory, namely that when translated to Norway Brexit
will increase support for the status quo or the EEA
Agreement. Since the pollsters did not include any ques-
tions about Brexit, we do not know how significant Brexit
was in prompting these changes.
We can however approach the question of corre-
lation indirectly by querying to what extent important
opinion-makers such as political parties, political advo-
cacy organizations and other politically relevant actors,
such as employers’ and employees’ organizations advo-
cated changes versus defended the status quo. The
balance of status quo defenders and political change
entrepreneurs will give us additional information on the
factors and forces driving the patterns of public opinion
that we observe.
4.3. Actors Debating or Initiating Changes to Norway’s
EU Relationship
The strong and rising support for the EEA Agreement
in public opinion polls may reflect a positive endorse-
ment of the agreement, or it may reflect a lack of viable
options. It has long been themantra of governing parties
that there is no alternative to the EEA Agreement if we
want to have assured market access to our closest neigh-
bors and trading partners. Opponents are therefore put
under pressure to come up with viable alternatives, and
Figure 1. EEA barometer. Source: Sentio (2020).
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Figure 2. EU barometer. Source: Sentio (2020).
some actors, as we will show, refer to Brexit as the vehi-
cle to open up the door to such alternatives.
4.3.1. Political Parties
With regard to political parties, we focus only on those
instances where party programs or officials make explicit
references to Brexit as themotivation for the change pro-
posal. We have examined the party programs for all polit-
ical parties from 2013 to the present. In addition, we
have examined parliamentary plenary debates as well as
debates in the Norwegian Parliament’s European Affairs
Committee from the time of Brexit and up until today in
search of information on howMPs think Brexit will affect
Norway’s EU relationship.
The following party programs mention Brexit explic-
itly, Red, a party with Marxist-Leninist roots, which got
2.4% in the 2017 parliamentary election; the environ-
mental party theGreens,which got 3.2% in the 2017 elec-
tion; and the Center Party, formerly the farmers’ party
which got 10.3% of the vote in the 2017 election. Red, in
its party program for 2017–2021 notes that:
Red wants the power back to the people, not to
delegations in Brussels and other power centers
that negotiate agreements behind our back, against
the popular will. The EU’s supranational structure
and market liberalism are something the people of
Europe do not want. Countless popular referenda in
EU countries have shown that, now last when the
British voted in favor of exiting the EU in June 2016.
(Red, 2017, p. 78, authors’ translation)
Politically speaking, Red as Norway’s most left-wing
party is far apart from the UK Tories that are driving
Brexit. The main thrust of Brexit is therefore the Brexit
mantra of ‘taking back control,’ in other words an argu-
ment in favor of sovereignty. Beyond that there are no
grounds for assuming that the deeply capitalism-critical
party Red will want any of the other policies that the
UK Tories propound.
The Greens, in the party program for 2017–2021,
notes that:
Brexit shows that popular trust in the EU is at
a historic low, a result of among other things
increased economic differences, fear of conse-
quences of increased immigration and democratic
deficit. Together with our European sister parties
the Greens will work to reform the EU-system and
the EEA Agreement, with more transparency, more
democracy, better protection of climate and environ-
ment and more participation as the goals. (Greens,
2017, p. 85, authors’ translation)
It is interesting that the Greens not only underline a
European cooperation strategy to foster change rather
than a national strategy, but also propagate changes that
will strengthen the EU.
The Center Party notes in its party program for
2017–2021 that:
The British popular referendum on EU membership
has created a completely new dynamics in Europe
and will probably create a new opportunity space
for alternatives to the EU’s goal of an ever closer
union. Norway must actively exploit the opportuni-
ties that the new situation creates. If it becomes
possible, Norway should actively cooperate with
Great Britain to create an alternative connection
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to the EU where both market access and national
sovereignty are ensured. (Centre Party, 2017, p. 87,
authors’ translation)
All three parties are on the left-of-center in the Norwe-
gian political landscape. Red is on the far left, Greens
is closer to the center. The Center Party is a centrist
party that in the last decade has been part of the
Labor-led coalition. Red and the Center Party are the
two most Eurosceptical parties in Norway, and have
been so as long as the issue has existed. All three par-
ties’ stances to different degrees advocate changes to
Norway’s present EU affiliation but in quite different
directions. The Center Party and Red see Brexit as open-
ing space for altering Norway’s formal EU affiliation, to
regain Norwegian sovereignty. The Centre Party depicts
Brexit as a great opportunity and actively seeks to politi-
cize Norway’s EU affiliation, and as such operates as a
political entrepreneur in the sense of the benchmark
theory. Finally, all three parties present Brexit as an occa-
sion to question the socioeconomic model that Norway
has been subjected to through its EU-affiliation, espe-
cially Red, which explicitly associates the EU with mar-
ket liberalism.
The Socialist Left Party (what is now Sosialistisk
Venstreparti and got 6% of the vote in the 2017 election)
has historically speaking been Eurosceptic and wants to
replace the EEA Agreement with a less committing trade
and cooperation agreement with the EU. It wants more
market regulation and democracy. Representatives from
the Socialist Left Party presented a Private Members’
Bill to Parliament in 2019 bent on initiating a public
inquiry on alternatives to the EEA Agreement that would
involve a less binding or committing relationship. Party
leader Audun Lysbakken argued that the relationship
between the EU and non-member countries is chang-
ing, and that “the truth is that we still do not know
what type of agreement Great Britain and the EU will
strike….It will, however, establish a new template for
the relationship between the EU and non-member coun-
tries” (Lysbakken, 2019, authors’ translation). The pro-
posal was turned down by a majority of the parlia-
mentary committee, which argued that it was lopsided
and that the benefits of renegotiation were uncertain.
Labor (Arbeiderpartiet, which got 27.4% in the 2017
election) has historically been pro-EU but has also been
deeply divided internally (60–40 split in favor of EU
membership). Labor underlines the need to retain the
EEA Agreement but also expresses reservations about
the negative effects on the labor market and workers’
rights. The Christian Democrats, historically the party
that has been most committed to the EEA Agreement,
underlines the need to retain Norway’s present EU affil-
iation. The Christian Democrats maintain that a bilat-
eral trade agreement will not provide the same mar-
ket access, and that Norway must support binding inter-
national and European cooperation to solve Europe’s
refugee challenge. The Conservative Party (Høyre) which
got 25% of the vote in the 2017 national election and
is traditionally the most supportive of EU membership
has toned down the support for EU membership and
instead underlines the need to retain Norway’s current
EU affiliation.
Europe’s Eurosceptic (or even Europhobe) right-wing
populists have uniformly hailed Brexit as a great oppor-
tunity to undo the EU’s influence. The Progress Party
(which got 15.2% of the vote in the 2017 election) and
is Norway’s right-wing populist party does not mention
Brexit explicitly in any of its party programs. In effect,
if we look at the Progress Party’s EU stance, it has his-
torically been supportive of the EEA Agreement, and it
is only in the last few years that it has come out explic-
itly against Norwegian EU membership. Its main con-
cerns now are with Schengen and export of social ben-
efits. Both issues are explicitly linked to immigration, but
the Progress Party is mainly concerned with limiting non-
Western immigration. This focus on minor changes to
Norway’s current EU affiliation is not universally shared.
There are some maverick politicians in the party that
cast Brexit as an opportunity for a major reshuffling of
Norway’s external relations: Tybring-Gjedde, who sits
on the European Affairs Committee, has argued that
Norway could come together with the UK, US, Iceland
and Canada to form a trade alliance exceeding the EU in
size (Tybring-Gjedde, 2019).
This brief overview has shown that the great major-
ity of Norwegian political parties with a significant major-
ity of the electorate behind them (figures similar to what
the polls yielded), support the status quowith onlyminor
changes. What puts Norway apart from much of Europe
is that the right-wing populist party is far less Eurosceptic
than its sister parties across Northern Europe.
4.3.2. Social Movements and Interest Groups
The single most important social movement focusing
explicitly on Norway’s EU affiliation is the No to the EU
organization that at present has around 20,000 mem-
bers nationwide. It plays a central role as a watchdog,
and has shown a tremendous ability to mobilize politi-
cal opposition to EU membership in the run-up to both
EU referendums. In 1994, Nei til EU (No to the EU) had
138,426 members (Bjørklund, 2005, p. 82). In contrast,
the yes side had at its most 35,000 members. No to the
EU presented a report in 2017 on Brexit’s importance for
Norway and saw it as a major spur to changing the status
quo, not by Norway copying the British agreement but by
creating a new situation:
[Brexit] entails new opportunities for Norway that
must be seized. The clear goal of the British is
a new agreement with the EU that ensures that
they regain control of their own laws. The British
could trigger calls [the original Norwegian text uses
‘be a wall-breaker’] for a new Norwegian solution
based on the same principles….Norway ought also
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 79–89 86
to negotiate a new agreement with the EU which
is without the unilateralism and supranationality of
the EEA Agreement. This can take place through
a bilateral agreement with the EU or through a
regional EFTA–EU agreement where also Switzerland
and Great Britain take part. (No to the EU, 2017, p. 48,
authors’ translation, authors’ emphasis)
No to the EU’s main focus is sovereignty; there is no
mention of the UK’s preferred socioeconomic model
post-Brexit.
There are also employers’ and employees’ organiza-
tions, which have substantial agenda-setting powers in
Norway on matters relating to the EU and EEA (Official
Norwegian Reports, 2012, p. 276). The two most central
organizations, representing labor and private enterprise
respectively, are the Norwegian Confederation of Trade
Unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise.
They have historically been, and still are, supportive of
the EEA Agreement; the privileged access to the internal
market it provides and the association it has to economic
stability and growth.
While both the Norwegian Confederation of Trade
Unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise
support the EEA Agreement, their views have at times
differed strongly. For the Unions, the agreement is con-
troversial for how it challenges the Norwegian socioe-
conomic model by prompting privatization, deregula-
tion of the labor market and the influx of posted work-
ers facilitated by the EEA and the Schengen Agreement.
In 2018, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise
and the Federation of Norwegian Industries brought an
appeal to the European Surveillance Authority after a
case against the Norwegian Tariff Committee related to
the mandatory reimbursement of posted worker’s travel
costs had been lost on the part of the employer’s orga-
nization in the Supreme Court. The fact that representa-
tives of private enterprise brought a case already settled
by Norway’s Supreme Court to a supranational body for
it to be overruled in the disfavor of labor interests caused
outrage among the unions. Hans-Christian Gabrielsen,
head of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions,
accused the employer’s organization of “placing a bomb
underneath the EEA” (Haugan, 2018). Cases like this have
led to mounting criticism of the EEA Agreement among
labor union fractions. It culminated in 2019 when a sub-
sidiary organization of the Norwegian Confederation of
Trade Unions, The United Federation of Trade Unions’
put forward a proposition at their General Assembly that
would change its stance on the EEA Agreement from pos-
itive to negative. This could have had ramifications on
the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions’ position
as well, and in turn put political pressure on the EEA pos-
itive left leaning parties in parliament.
Given that the principal argument for Brexit in
Great Britain was regaining national regulatory and judi-
cial autonomy, Brexit could easily have functioned as
a benchmark for labor unions who were displeased
with the prevalence of EU regulations and EU law in
Norway. Interestingly, the opposite seems to be the
case. At the above mentioned 2019 General Assembly,
The Federation of Trade Unions (2019, p. 10) stated that:
“The Brexit process in Great Britain demonstrates that it
is hardly a realistic alternative to renegotiate the core
tenets of the EEA Agreement.” This speaks to the fact
that many of the political forces in Norway that are criti-
cal of the EEA and thus among thosemost likely to regard
Brexit as a benchmark, do not actually see Brexit as a
benchmark for future Norway–EU relations.
To sum up thus far, the employer’s and employee’s
organizations have not altered their views on Norway’s
relationship with the EU as a result of Brexit. Similar
to pro-EEA political parties, the employer’s organiza-
tions continue to support the EEA Agreement because
it assures continued economic stability. The employees’
organizations, on the other hand, have a much more
ambivalent view of the EEA, and to an extent share the
Brexit movement’s aim of restoring sovereignty.
5. Conclusion
This article assessed whether Brexit has spurred a
reassessment of Norway’s EU relationship, and the
implications for the EU’s relations with affiliated non-
members. The analysis shows that the assumptions we
derived from the benchmark theory were mostly con-
firmed. The government and the major political parties
saw Brexit as a challenge to a depoliticized status quo
that they sought to protect. That included rejecting pro-
posals for studies to explore the effects of less binding
alternative affiliations than the EEA Agreement. The pref-
erence for the status quo is aligned with public opinion.
Somepolitical entrepreneurs sought to change the status
quo but did not agree on what they wanted to change:
renegotiate the EEA Agreement; renegotiate Schengen;
or sign a less comprehensive trade agreement. There
was little appetite for a new EU membership debate.
Some political entrepreneurs stressed sovereignty, but
they generally diverged from the UK’s preferred socioe-
conomic model. Others expressed concern about the
EU’s neoliberal turn and the problem of social dumping
associated with labor mobility. But whereas this stance
appears to dovetail with the Brexiteers’ onus on regu-
lating immigration, it was not the immigration-critical,
right-wing populist Progress Party that was most eager
to change the status quo, but parties on the far left.
The change-oriented Norwegian political entrepreneurs
endorsed a socioeconomic model that was much fur-
ther to the left than are the UK Conservatives (even
those in favor of state aid). An important reason for
the lack of explicit reference to the UK as a benchmark
on the socioeconomic dimension is precisely this signifi-
cant discrepancy in understandings of solidarity and eco-
nomic justice.
With regard to the implications that we can discern
for the EU’s relationswith affiliated non-members, Brexit
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thus far works more as a deterrent, than as an induce-
ment for change. Whether this is mainly due to the tan-
gled Brexit process or whether it is due to the fact that,
at least for Norway, Brexit left little scope for linking
sovereignty to the socioeconomic problems that actors
associate with the present EU affiliation requires further
investigation. Note that formerly EU-supportive social
democrats largely share these socioeconomic concerns.
In the Brexit negotiations, concerns with social justice
and environmental standards figured strongly in the EU’s
demands to the UK, but this does not appear to increase
Norwegians’ support for EU membership.
Our analysis shows that we cannot assess Brexit as
a benchmark without paying attention to the sheer size
and magnitude of the EU–Norway power asymmetry.
That affects the actors’ assessments: risk and uncertainty
figure prominently and bring up the question of whether
the EU should be more accommodating in its relations
with non-members. In that context, from the EU’s per-
spective, the distinction between those that qualify for
EU membership and those that do not probably matters.
The EU has proven exceptionally inclusive with regard to
non-members that qualify for EU membership (the EFTA
states)—provided they abide by EU laws and regulations.
But there are limits. If the EU is very accommodating to
states that qualify for membership but refuse to seek it,
the EU risks lowering the bar for exit or pleas to renego-
tiate the terms of membership from its member states.
In that sense Brexitmay expose the special arrangements
that EFTA states have with the EU.
These considerations remind us that the EU as a
non-state entity is particularly disposed to import cen-
trifugal pressures from how it structures its affiliations
with non-members.
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